mine-action managers find themselves faced
with today. In the simplest of all strategy
formulas, we ask “Where are we? Where do
we want to go? How do we get there?” If we
do not know where we want to go, no effective strategy can be planned, and we will
surely never reach our goal.

Many signatories have emphasized their
position at each of the seven Convention
Review Conferences that “impact free” just
does not measure up to the specific requirements of Article 5. However, the European
Community’s policy “is to drastically reduce
the lingering threat and impact of land-

The mine-action train can be efficient and effective with better cooperation and confluence within the community.
PHOTO COURTESY OF GEOFF CRYER, WWW.GEOFFSPAGES.CO.UK

There are various guideposts for
global mine action, but none so universally applied as the requirements of the
Ottawa Convention. Article 5 (Clearance)
of that document appears to be unambiguous: “Each State Party undertakes to
destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines.”4 Thus the Convention
seems to call for what some (such as the
Landmine Monitor) define as a “mine free”
world. And yet the very first words of the
Convention imply that the reason for the
formal agreement is that the States Parties
are “Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties.”4 This suggests the reason for implementing the Convention was
to alleviate the practical threat of landmines.
Some have taken that position under the rubric of “impact free.” Sara Sekkenes of the
United Nations Development Programme
points out that neither term—mine-free nor
impact-free—is found in the Convention.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find
champions for each point of view. Richard
Kidd of the U.S. Department of State provides a sharp and succinct explanation of
why he believes that a “mine free” global
endstate is impractical: “No donor, lending
institution and no major impacted country
has indicated a willingness to put up the
huge amounts of resources required to find
and clear every last mine.” 7   
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mines.”8 It has therefore articulated a “zerovictim target.” In a situation in which many
nations at risk receive support and advice
from many different quarters, they are often
given conflicting or nebulous guidance.
What is clear is that the differences
among the approaches will be vast. Clearing
all landmines from all affected countries
by 2009 or 2010 will not only be daunting but resource-intensive. Just as in curing
any social ill (pollution, extreme poverty,
HIV/AIDS, malnutrition, unemployment,
etc.), erasing the very last vestiges of the
threat often requires the largest application
of resources. This comes at a time when there
are indications that donor funding will become more difficult to obtain. Alistair Craib
of the United Kingdom gave a sobering
discussion of this trend at the Mine Action
Directors Meeting in July 2006.9
We at the MAIC further note that only
12 countries are on a pace to complete their
Article 5 requirements by 2009. This alone
suggests that the absolute position of Article
5 may be unrealistic. If Belgium is not
ready to declare itself free of all landmines,
how can we expect that Laos, Cambodia,
Mozambique and the many other impacted
countries will be able to do so within the
specified time period?
A clear and compelling explanation of
the ramifications of the decisions of a mine-

action program is set out in Bob Keeley’s article, “Are We Setting the Wrong Target?”10
After reaching the conclusion that the literal
application of Article 5 would be impractical,
he makes a logical assumption that an endstate should be defined as being “the point
where there is no economic demand for the
land left uncleared and where all reasonable
and practicable steps have also been taken to
prevent casualties in the areas that remain
contaminated.” Keeley implores us to have
the courage to face this issue head on and
modify Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention.
Whither the Mine-Action Express?
Never before in the short history of mine
action have there been so many emerging
ideas and opportunities for improvements
and enhancements to mine action. But neither have there been so many distractions
and competing ideas. There is no authoritative monolith to make these decisions for
us. Just as we have had to build mine action through coordinated and sometimes
informal actions in the past, we will have to
achieve consensus in the future. Selecting,
combining, designing and engineering the
way ahead will be difficult—and probably
painful. The goal is to stay calm, stay focused, and construct an engine that will
operate efficiently and powerfully in dealing
with one of the great pervasive threats of the
21st century: post-crisis recovery.
See Endnotes, page 109
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The Rise of ERW as a Threat to Civilians
In this article, the author looks at the rise of landmines
and ERW1 as military tactics from the First World War
to current conflicts. The safety risk their presence
The methods used in warfare have changed over the years,
causing more threats to civilians, such as these people killed
in Darfur in 2005.
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poses and various measures to protect civilians are
also discussed.

by Lt. Colonel Mohamed Taghioullah Ould Nema [ Mauritania National Demining Office ]

S

ince the beginning of the 20th century, the world has witnessed
several destructive and deadly wars. Two of the most horrific
were the First and Second World Wars, during which explosives,
engines, rockets and shells were used widely. Many people died and
large amounts of property were destroyed. Of great concern is that
a significant number of people continue to be at risk due to the existence of thousands of explosive remnants of war, including landmines,
resulting from these and other conflicts.
To some degree, landmines are losing their importance in the face
of the new trends in military tactics, as can be observed in the recent massive military campaigns in Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Lebanon, for example. These conflicts have essentially been led as air
strikes rather than ground attacks. This change in tactics produces a
complicated situation in which children and other innocent civilians
increasingly have to deal with a large quantity of unexploded debris
(missiles, shells, rockets, bombs, engines) right in their own communities and homes. This new environment of the battlefield contributes
to worsening significantly the living situation for civilians—buildings
and bridges are destroyed; many fires spread due to the presence of incendiary ammunition and explosions or flames; broken iron and glass
litter communities; people suffer a loss of electricity due to the destruction of electric power stations; etc.
Consequently, civilian protection during a conflict nowadays should
be the most important activity in the mine-action process. Otherwise,
the most vulnerable civilians may be severely injured or killed simply
because they find themselves near military targets during air strikes,
and later because of the potentially huge and unfortunate ERW risks
that will be difficult to overcome following the conflict.
The two World Wars gave landmines an important tactical role.
The combination of tank and air strikes was a crucial strategic principle for success during these wars. At the same time, in order to protect
one’s own position from the infantry’s attack or an armoured assault,
the strategy was often to use landmines and create minefields. Mines
were used as an efficient way to harass the enemy, defend one’s own
location, cover one’s troops from attackers and reinforce one’s military
equipment. They were an important component of the tactical manoeuvre used that included artillery strikes, aircraft hits, and armoured
and infantry actions.

As time went on, the effectiveness of tanks and new weapons lessened the need for minefields as a solution against armoured attacks.
For instance, during World War II the Italian, British and German
forces all laid mountains of landmines in northern Africa, but the
mines weren’t as effective as in the past because the tanks used by the
military could roll right over them without being affected. Because so
many mines were emplaced, huge quantities of landmines and ERW
remain today.
Increased Use of Missiles and Ordnance in the Gulf Wars
On 15 January 1991, U.N. Coalition Forces started air raids on
Iraq, but the ground attack did not begin until 24 February. This situation reflects how the previously important role of the tank in warfare
has lessened and how mines as well have lost some of their value as a
weapon in armed conflict. With battle tactics shifting to the air with
such warplanes as the F-1172 and B-523 and other aerial vectors that
drop immense quantities of bombs and rockets on the enemy, the battleground has changed. Increasingly sophisticated weaponry, such as
the Patriot missile,4 and other means of aerial attack and defence were
used in the first Gulf War and since to gain a strategic advantage. The
resulting destruction from these tactics is systematic, leading to massive collateral damage on the ground.
The tactics of modern warfare have continued to involve more
ERW than mines, as seen in the March 2003 invasion of Baghdad,
Iraq, during which Coalition Forces dropped munitions from the air
in large quantities. As a result, the incidence of ERW has grown significantly, while the use of landmines is decreasing. In addition, Iraq has
seen a large increase in the use of improvised bombs, missiles and other explosive devices by non-state actors, leading again to an increased
threat of harm from ERW.
As a result, ERW—instead of mines—are now the biggest threat to
civilians; indeed, this shift in warfare highlights the need for a new approach to mine action in order to deal with the very real consequences
of ERW for civilians in the aftermath of war.
Case in Point: Recent Conflict in Lebanon
The 34-day conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon that
ended 14 August 2006, involved a deployment of explosive weapons
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by both sides across the border along with
an Israeli ground invasion into Lebanon. In
particular, Israel dropped or fired over a million submunitions from cluster munitions
into Lebanese land.5
The destruction was systematic, leading to an environment at the end of the war
that is not only very unkind but also continues to be critically dangerous to civilians
due to the massive quantity of bombs,
bomblets, shells and rockets that remain
everywhere in southern Lebanon.
To the outside world, it seems during
Israel’s air strikes there was little difference
established between the military objectives
and civilian targets. Bridges, roads and
airports were destroyed to strategically cripple enemy forces; yet this also made the
delivery of humanitarian aid not only hard
but nearly impossible.
Suggestions for Protecting Civilians
Many measures can be taken to ensure
the safety of civilians, particularly with the

increased threats they face in modern warfare. In the Middle East and other regions
at risk of conflict, it is important to protect
civilians by providing the poorest countries
with bunkers and other protective installations in the main cities during peaceful
periods, with a particular focus on schools
and hospitals.
Additionally, international law should
strictly enforce the convention against killing civilians and destroying civilian areas
during conflict, prosecuting under criminal
law those who do not follow this convention. The United Nations Security Council
should also be given the power—and be
willing to use it—to stop any war in which
genocide is observed.
Finally, in mine action, activities need
to focus on providing updated awareness campaigns that are informed by the
changing reality of recent conf licts to ensure that children and other vulnerable
people are protected.
See Endnotes, page 109
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The authors present a critique of the International Mine Action Standards currently in use. After highlighting gaps in IMAS related to assessment and survey,
an improved aspect of mine-action planning methodology is presented, which
includes a prioritization component using a socioeconomic approach. The re-
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sult is LIRA: landmine impact combined with a new measurement of risk assessment. This updated model can contribute to improved safety, quality and
productivity of landmine action through more effective strategic planning tools.
by Eddie Banks [ EOD World Services ] and Rob Shahmir [ Environment and Infrastructure Group of Companies ]

Conference on Women in Armed Groups, Human Rights
In November 2005, Geneva Call and the Program for the Study of International Organization(s) from
the Geneva-based Graduate Institute of International Studies held a workshop in Ethiopia entitled
“Women in Armed Opposition Groups in Africa and the Promotion of International Humanitarian Law
and Human Rights.”
The workshop sought ways to strengthen international humanitarian and human-rights law within
African armed groups and their political groups. Thirty-nine female leaders from armed opposition groups and civil society from countries currently involved in conflict or recently involved
in the post-conflict recovery process came together for the conference. The workshop also sought
to increase the international community’s understanding of and ability to work with African
armed groups.
Four
1.
2.
3.
4.

topics were discussed in working groups during the workshop:
Humanitarian law
Human-rights law
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
Transition into governance roles

The final report from the conference, which presents information and analyses that came out of
these four thematic working groups, is available in English and will soon be available in French.
The report can be downloaded at http://snipurl.com/xiy4. If you would like a printed copy of the
report, e-mail info@genevacall.org.
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T

he vast majority of mine action is paid for with donor funds,
but are these funds always utilized for the optimum benefit
of the affected population? Any money spent on bureaucracy
lessens what is available for reducing the physical, social, psychological and economic effects of conflict. Many argue, with some justification, that attempting to impose international mine-action standards
(or even International Organization for Standardization [ISO]
standards)1 on populations clearly unaccustomed to these methods
can, without appropriate managerial training and support, jeopardize
lives for the sake of attaining a standard they may not be capable of
achieving. Any increase in safety and quality requirements must be
measured against productivity; in other words, any funds used to pay
for stringently high safety and quality standards must be measured
against the lives lost and injuries inflicted by the consequent reduction in clearance activities.
The original intention for standards such as the International
Mine Action Standards2 was that they should form a baseline by
which pragmatic implementation of a foundation of “standards”
would take into account the particular situation in each affected
country. However, recent interpretations of the text illustrate that
the IMAS have now become a vehicle for those who wish to impose
standards. The cost of some projects has been dramatically increased
by those using IMAS as a quality-assurance/quality-control vehicle
to increase demands on or delay the work, whether through a lack
of understanding, a difference in interpretation of the text or by design. In some cases, the IMAS documents seem to confuse rather
than clarify due to unclear text and a plethora of paperwork. In one
specific area—assessment and survey—the IMAS appear to have lost
direction.3 The aims and objectives of these standards (and the number of other documents and references) made throughout the IMAS
are the subject of this article.

Reviewing the Present Policy, Standards and Documents
While we acknowledge the IMAS have created a sound foundation, they have also created a mountain of documentation. For
example, in IMAS 08.10–General Mine Action Assessment
and 08.20–Technical Survey,4 references are made to other documents such as the Technical Notes for Mine Action series.5 In addition, guideline documents such as the Socio-Economic Approaches to
Mine Action 6 and others illustrate the number of documents available
just on this subject, all providing a snapshot and additional text but
none of them providing a complete answer. Indeed if one collects
all the relevant IMAS information and the associated documents,
it amounts to a small library. Added to these are the organizational
documents such as standard operating procedures, safety handbooks,
documents for training courses and related lesson plans. All these
documents also need to be translated into the national language, so
the quantity is doubled and anyone involved in national programs
will understand the effort, time and cost of obtaining accurate translations and maintaining such a library (to ISO standards). Having
produced a multitude of documents, it appears that there is a need to
review the very premise for some of these documents.
Getting the Right Premise
The various documents referred to above all make the right
noises. However, if the aim of mine action is to strive for effectiveness and efficiency, then there is still much work to be done.
If another aim is national ownership of clearance programs, more
work is needed here also.
First, we need to reduce duplication and simplify documentation. In addition, we need to understand that in order to create a
“standards mentality,” documents must be in national languages.
There is also a need to ensure donations are measured for their cost
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